Never Trust a Corporation by Bratton, William W
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
2002 
Never Trust a Corporation 
William W. Bratton 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons, Business Organizations Law 
Commons, and the Law and Society Commons 
Repository Citation 
Bratton, William W., "Never Trust a Corporation" (2002). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 1443. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1443 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
Willi am W . Bratton'' 
vvoulcl like tn sta rt by noting multitudinous object ions to assertions 
made in Larry Mitchell's Corporme Jrresponsihilily: America ·s Nnvesr Ex -
pon. 1 But I wai\'C these points for purposes of this Symposium . r wou!d 
prefer to take th e occ ~·:sion to celebratE: t.he boo k. Sc1 I \viii n1ake t \VO p ~.J int s 
on th e subjec t of C\'i"f'< 'r~:tc :'oci cl l r•:::spcjnsibilitv em \Vhi ch the book <l ii cl I 
stand in compkle tt(COrL!. 
!. The Enduring Debate 
Tbc first point is tha t corpora te social rcsponsibiiity is a problem that 
never goes <::nvay, whet he r from policy agendas in academic corporate law or 
in the wider economy and polity. So a book like Co1porote Irresponsibi!iry is 
always welcome even if it heralds no regulatory revo lutio n. T11e book is par-
ticularly welcome at present as we look back at the immed iate past- a n era 
in which the norm of sh<lre holcl er value maximiza tion was carried for th to th e 
world as America· s greates t gift to the global economy since mass prod ucti on 
i tse If. 
My second point is that corporations are inherently untrustworthy. Cor-
porate Jrresponsibilily does an especia lly able job o f teaching this lesson. The 
book describes the difference between human beings as moral actors ancl 
human beings as corporate actors. persuasive ly depicting corporate actors as 
otherwise responsible people who can become irrespo nsible as they go forth 
in pursuit of their firms' object ives. In th e book's description. people leave 
behind the human exercises of choice and responsibility as they act out th <.:: ir 
corporate roles. A lthough we mode l corpora tions in law as constructed 
human beings anci ~1ccorci them the privilege to act as if they were human 
beings, th ey do not Jm! CHHlot replicate our moral :,;entirnents .= Thus. says 
the book, a co rp oratinn cannot comm it to a re la tion shi p nr trust in th e S<mL: 
way as a human bein g. i<c r should it be expected to rcplicHc the acti ons ot' ,; 
good citizen. 
U ltimately, th r:~:e two poi nts coliapse into a s ingle ooint . To see corpo r ~:­
tions as .inherently untru:;t\vort hy is to s~..~~e \vhy corporate soc la! responsibility 
is a policy probJCi"fl lh:Jl l!CV~r go<~S 21 \Va:v·. }\ifany Of rn y gc:ne.rat i.on v i ~\V thi :·_~ 
subject as son1t:thing pe ople V/Orr icd :about in l hc l in clays of ~vY'a1. ·~·rg tltc' 
\Vitch-hunts anc! r ~ rk~.\ ivt: ie ft-of-centcr I-;olitica l c:ssu rnptions. Corporate :~t) ·· 
ciai respon5ibility is n . .:·n; e n1 bered as a bubble of po licy t ~dk that grc\v ~1 nd 
g r e\V On ly tO burst dft Cr 19 ~~~0 . \\'hCll COld \Vater \VC1S r:oured 0 11 etll visiort~ll·>· 
schen1cs p ropus~.::::d in 1hc pub lic interest. But thc1t l97CJ:; -~1ttc1ck on the c~.Jrp c i--
·--------·---- ---- - --- ----· ------ ··-·- ·-··· 
School. 
1 L .. \\\'R[_i,;t'!~. E. \1:'1": :! L l. l . . c( ) \~['()i'. .-\TE ! J< RC S !'I)0-' S il. )] ~. lT Y" .·\ .\ !F l·~l ( ",\·~.; l~t:_ \\: r ~ · : · L.~ > ~ · 
I'CWI (2(1() j ). 
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ra tion , tho ugh intense, was not a o ne- time-on l:v event. It carr ied una discus-
sio n that began as soon as cor po ra te mass produc tion's imp!icati ons for 
society and the eco nomy becam e clea r at th e tum of the le:1st er: ntury. :; 
1l1e m ain issues in the curren t debat e \v,~ r e id entified no iatcr th an 1032. 
whe n the Harvord Law Revie1 t· !)ub li shec! t he famous E>::rk-Doclc! dcbte:1 
The participants in this Sym pu-;iu m could :·,~ma in h(·rc fur <l.n in ::_ki'i~·Jitc pc-
r iDd debt.i t in g the questi on \\/h::th~r :s o n: ~ t h ing co n c rc t~ can be du r1c tu rn ~l1~ ~..:: 
curpurations mo re responsible . dild I suspect that i1 ttle mo re would be ac-
co rnplish ed than a res ta tem ent ul points made by Be rie a nd Dodd. Dod d 
played th e role that Larry !'vlitchcil ass um es in th e book. a rg uing that man -
age ment must be enabled to tak.:; mo 1· :1 ! responsibi li ty 5 Bcrle 1ook \Vha t we 
now call the shareholder value position. arguing that fid e li ty to th e share-
hold er interest imports th e onl y feasible constraint on management empow-
erment.6 Today 's debates differ primaril y in th ei r extensio n to th e globa l 
venue and a consequent increase in the stakes . But if, as see ms likely. the 
present ge neration leaves the problem ot corpo rate social respon :> ibility un-
solved, a subsequent gene ra tion will re inve nt the d iscussion ye t ~1g8in . 
II. Can a Corporation A ct Responsibly? 
To develop further the assertion that co rporat ions arc inherently un-
trustworth y, I would like to inte rroga te a contrary poss ibil ity . R eca ll that 
visionary governance schemes des igned to make management socia ll y re-
sponsibl e encounter a stand ard di sm issal: in a world with price competition. 
a stable equilibrium of responsible gove rnance could ne ver e vo lve because 
so me firm s would a lways give in to the te mptatio n to defect a ncl ga in market 
share by saving the costs of responsib ility. Bu t need t hat b e the case') Sup-
pose we take the view th at life is jus t one big Priso ners· Di!ernmcl ii1 which 
cou peratio n, if we can sustain it. nwkcs us be tter otT in th e lo ng run. G ive n 
thi s assumption. corporati o ns in the lo ng run arguab iy should fine! coo p.::rc~­
t io n with their wider societ ies to he compatible with sc if-intcresl. 1f we tak e 
thi s point-that coo peration shu ulcl bc incenti ve comp21 ti b lc for ~~ corpo ra-
ti on-we can at least plausibiy suggc:)t th~1 t corporation:.; cou ld kan1 tha t co-
ope rati o n with the socie ty in \\ hich th ey op,~rat e lies in the ir lo ng-term 
inte rest. O nce thus instructed, corporat io ns cou ld become responsible actors 
in soci ety, even as they remain purpos i··.'e ac tors witho ut the c:·~ peri encc of 
moral sentiments. 
-r,, e economist Robert Fran k taJ..:c:c; us a couple oi' step~: in r>~: cii rccticn 
o f this vi sion of a respon sible corpord tiun. f-1~.: s:J.ggest:; tha t so ci~: t ny ;·csponsi -
b le firrn s n1ight ind eed survi\ ·c in ~: con tpct.lti\.:c c :r,.:iron rn {~ n t. r-zesr--:cnsibdity_ 
he ~1 rgu es. n1akes a firin bette r ~:d 1 i c ·10 so lve CO i11iT1 itrncnt r· l · o bl .- >-n ~; ctrnc ngst 
·- --·--- - "·-·"-- ---- ------------ ···--"- ·------------ --
_"; Sel.'. e.g .. THOR~:T E :--~ \'r::BJ.l-'. ~ . ~ i~l lt ·: T iJFI-:i \.Y ( )J : B t. - ~ l >.: Fs;-.. ~:--.:T F.! Z J'!-~i\!.-: \ ) 1};;.)):, 
ing. \\'Ork 0 1' inslittaioncd CCOihJil1i C~ )-
H.\!'\ L H;; \. l l ~:l (1':!32 ). 
~ .\n.: !),Jdd . supr~ ; n ett': 4. at 1!5_-:; _.,5~ . 
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its :;harehclde rs. manage rs. and e mployees 7 i t improves customer relations." 
lt fc!c i!it <lks the recru itment of th e best p•::rsonnel." It makes long-te rm coop-
<.:ration with other firms easier to sustain. 1' 1 Fin~tl iy. d reputation for respo nsi-
L·)ic beh<\v ior mi ght even ad vantctge a corpurat iun i11 the product mmket. 11 
rr~l il k clear ly is r ight. Corpor;Hions h ;l \ ' c plenty or e lbO\\'fOOlll in which 
ru i_:;_~· ~- (? :~p~.;ns i}-:•l e ;tnd n1~1y cvc:1 t.:ui1cc1_ ~i~.:.nd·i~-~· :.:n i. fin;_JIH.:ial rc\vards for so 
should iH.'t iJ,~ surprised when we :>ee corp nr<:li \l!l :O <~Clin g responsibly. 
III Corpomrions us Oe(euon 
The greater point that the public may re ly upon corpo rations to be have 
responsibly docs not, however, follow from the lesser point that responsibil-
it y can be compatible with share ho lder va lue e nhanceme nt. With corpora-
tions . res ro nsible beh;wior is inevi tabl y contingent on th e total dispensa tion 
of circumstances. They always active ly threate n to di sa ppoint u~ .. I would 
like to make <l case for this assert ion that parallels the case made in th e book. 
i'vfy argu men t begins vvith Robert Frank 's famous commitment model, a 
source on which the book also draws. 12 
Frank taught us that because human beings have fee lings, they can sus-
tain cooperation. unlike the economists' rational actors. In Frank's descrip-
tion. emotions lead us to act against self interest and th e reby help us to stick 
to our commitments. Emotions make us more fit as re lational counterpar-
ties. Given gains from cooperat ion. mo ral ly moti vated actors will out-
perform the economists' ration al actor:>. 1·' Moreover. in order to construct a 
robust mode l of sustained coope rat ion ove r time. we will have to leave the 
r:1tion8i <1 Ctor out of the descrip tion and subs titut e coope ra tive actors in 
who:11 cultural training and behavioral predi sposi tion inte ract to genera te 
n1o1· (li se ntin1e nts . 1 ~ 
i· ~ ow . ccnside r two oth er point:; offered by Frank . Frank observes that 
se<; \c <Xu numies figure importantly in the ,;mergence of cooperation: we co-
cpt~ r< il e bcc,lusc \Ve must to get the cost be nefits of production in large faci li-
Ties15 E.\\ cnding the poinl. even though firms <ilT uncoopcr<Jt ive actors . 
productir.;n in firm s is an int·.:: n:;e lv coop,::rativ,; phenomenon. \Vhen actors 
within firTn~ ; cooperate, they clcve lop cultures that di st inguish sharply be-
~Y.:cen insicic 21ncl outs ide int erests . The second point comes from the ,~volu -
---------·--·- - --- - - ---- ·--- -
7 r~~· b ·.:n H. Frank . Cun .')'ociu!ly Rc'Sfit)nsih!(· Finn.,· Sun·i\·e in u c·runp!.!litil·c Etn'iron -
f? !(i:() . iii c(,i)C:~) O:}F c():~P l .: cT: DE!-1 .\ Vltl!<:\L R F~;i_: \!·~{ ' ]! i0'TO Hl .: ~J>~E>'S [T !-111 ''~ ;.:.:()_ lJ i-93 
{C'(l\:).J ~ .. i. \k'>; ~~ick S:.. ,~\nnE . Tcn brun~c! \.:d~ .. J lJl)(J\. 
~} lrl. ~ i l H l~ . 
~ ~ ,'\l ; :f ·!iFu .. supnr note l. at _::.·1. 
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!-l Sc~ · ~zn :·)=~rt i I. Frank. A 7!J {·t n y o.f .\lo;·,!f .\t': lfini i 'J!!s . in B EYt>.~D Sr.::LF L'< TF!U·: .~ · : · 71.73-
}7 (.hrh:' T ;\ · L;r:~;~; -,. ,·j:J :~~ t:d .. l'JOU). 
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tio nary gc1JYte theory in \vh ich Frank's conlnlilnlcnt n1odci i~ s itua ted: 
·~u op•:r.c1ror~; and defectors c2n cocx i ~.; t and c·vn!\e togeth e r wilhout e ither 
i-:rcup di s c-·t~-:·pcaring ov-~r Lirne .1'' 
'Tl1 e t"\V t) points. once ju.\ t~lp(Js cd \V ith th r.; cu rnnJi trne nt n1uc!c L trigge r the 
~<: -:n>:: qu es tiO!l posed in Cnrpu.;·u lc Jr;·cspuns·/biliry : in ~1 rn och..:! i.J f evolut ion-
,:r·· ( _- {_ : () r! c:r~·li.1cnL ~ sit ever ~< l_ L_- ~: _ 1 ~ : ::. : ·; u ~1 -:(: thnt p! : ty ~> · :~ th~! t hJppL' !t -~ u h ;.,; cor-
~ -l ~trJ-, ( j_n bei ngs ? l f cn!t) ti cnt ri"J ( il i_,__; ; ·~;, ;.;_< i-'r :_~n L. di id i'v litch c ll bulh in s 1~:. t_ i.hcn 
·'n-n1s ure d ii'f.-.::rent f run1 pc:~rpi e . '-vV h~..:n Lhr; circUIY;~tan~>.:: :; lnrJ ica lc: tllat i.h e 
~; ~~ ;·eq uircs r ~1 Li una l ~tc~ i on . ~l ;· i :·r~ -1 \.·v·dl b;;:. iTiurc likel y tu :n irnic th ,_; rc:-
ciu n:d t\:onom ic actor a nd ddect. :\ firm is n ~tw c.: likely tu act rationally be-
_·::wsc it is unconstrained by mor e1 ! ~;cn timent :; encomp,lssin g the int•.:t·ests of 
:: cto:-s on the outsid e. No t a hu ma n be ing. a firm cannot feel when it acts in 
th ':: outside economy. ft accord ingly re prese nts a constant threa t to coope ra-
tive types. 
The ci;Jss ic de scription of separe~ted ownership and contro l in th e large, 
publ icl y traded firm implies a similar wa rnin g. Separated ow nership and con-
t rol presen ts a govcnwnce proble rn because man age rs who ovvn small eq uity 
:s takes do not have the same ince nti ve to be responsible possessed by 100% 
property owners. In ga me theoretic te rms. manage ment operat ing und e r the 
;:: paration of ownership ancl contro l rece ives d ifferent payoffs from 2 given 
:Ktion than the firm consiclerecl as a se parate entity. Or in lawye rly te rms. 
there is a co nflict of inte rest. The vision o f the corporat io n as a potential 
:.!::.:fector app lies to both situatio ns--\\'he re man agement pursues the ovcr<lil 
i'i;·m intcrt:s t and where management pursues it::; own interes t. In either situa -
tion. th e corpo ration will approxima te: a r;:tional eco nomic actor more closely 
th an will most hum an bei ngs . 
I'' JO\V. there a re th eori es of th e firrn th ~1t n1i ght be dep loyed to re fu te thi s 
,;,c scrtion . The personified "r•.=<; i" firm of th e l\Vt..:i1ticth cent.ur:-/:; early cle -
:._:~_tdc?S \\'' CIS thought substanti,-llly to subsLi tut·.::: fo r ;. : rt-~al perso n. 17 Such t1 liv-
in g . orga i1i Zcltiona! orgc1n isn: c onct,; i vah l~·/ cc)uid b~-~ a coo pt; rato i· i n Fr ~lnk· 's 
:~ \~n s c: . Un ~)U l'pi·isin g l )1 • th.:1t th..: u ry·s proponents a lso ad voc tlted an .:xpa ncled 
/Unr~? tJf frce cion1 o f clct ion for fi r rns. ·rru:;r the f irn1s. the y s~t id: they {-!rc reai , 
l i kt; y~..)u. Cl nd \Vi li n1 ake yo 1J bcr t c r u ff. ~!__ ~: t~:; r 111 an ~tg,_::: ri;~d i~;ts Cl. )n t j n ucd the 
·· crust Lls·· line even a~; the "reed·· :'irn1 lu--;t it~ rc:3pe cl(lb iii ty· under critique 
(·rcrn SI.'Jc icli theorists and leg(_-d rc·.tl li st :·J. i\~ ianttg.crs \.\'~ repeop l e too. the y sa id. 
~ : ;;ct cuuid b~:: relied upon to doth,:~ ~ ; L ltcsn~~-i. n i i k~..: th ing if c nlpt-->\VC rcd . 1 -~ The 
:.>_! i1TC rnpo r· ;Jry nexus of COnt r act :-; ih c· ory ~ -;f l h£~ firrn appr0{1Chcs l h~ Ji rtJbic rn 
, ~,f Lh r~ flrn·t ·:·:; 1ntrinsic tc n cll:;-:cy t ( J de: feel fr 'J!ll ~tl1ut h ~.:r an.~~~~.: . [ -L.:rr.~. \\"(~ deny 
Lh::' fir 1~ ·1 · s ~:::. \ i s lcncc as (1f1 inci<:pc-nci , ... I-Jl (!Ctur in th t: econu 1r:y .i' l -,{ou dc~d n.o t 
·"\ !th ~t fin11_ \\·h1ch i::; ~1 th ct~g!1t c:.;n : .-: tr u c l~ :_-lnd l :~ g :. d f ic riun. L1ut v: ith ~;t hcr 
J\ (' l\" CL·r '.iili/! !i c 
!>~ :i.c't' D!_)(.Jd . Sl!fJI"U n u l ~..: -L ~it i i ) :-.:-h !. 
! tJ Th;v' i:;:-:...;·..: tl·x ~ i.' .\ i ich:t~~1 ~~- -.. ic· !-::->.::! ~-~ \\ .ii li ;;_i -1 1 ;-{ \ i\_·ck Ji ;·!~'-· Th l·o :y , ;_( ) 1,· !-in n. _\/ unu ~ 
.. . ;:!/ !\ · / ; ( l~ ·io r. - · ~ ,:.:~·il c_':" c·,. ,sis :.!Itt! ( Ji·,·:, l'·'·sf: if . \·u·r ; (-u .~ :·:·. :. .i . Ft:---: . !-=:c<l_'.: . 30:' . :-: j (t ~ l ~i 7 h } . }·!crl'. 
2002! Ne ver Trusi { ! Corpouuion <.....'7 1 (.) / 1 
hunwn be ings who may cause the leg<il :·ictio n to defect or cooperate as the 
c ts'.:: li1cl)' be. Look through to th e peep! <> 
Bu t the lega l fiction' s actions will not nece ssaril y rdkct the moral senti -
n!t_· nts or its hurnan agents. Let us sa y Lht~ firrn" s chief executive officer is (l 
Ct.H:}_)i_·ra ti\'e sort. ~v\1 i ll not a fi rrn k~ d b~-- '-i ~~· c)··~ '·· p~:t"~Jtivr...: tyr1e he~;_ coupcr ~it i v c 
<.' llli ~ \ - · .· \\/! th Fr~lnk \V e 1l1U St ~1cln1it th-~~ r~: 'l_~.~~ih;!it y . - r1h~- ~)I'~)b l :.~ n : is th!.li th(: 
u~ · ri .. :~r in ;_ht_; c~t:>ntc x l uf a p~rson a l ct_:Ltti u: L-;!l ip. i 1:·~ ! ·} 'J lr:~-:n being c~nl ~1ct 
d _~~un~; t in t ~re~ t and st ick to a conlrnit n-J ,_:nt \\-Hhour h ~ :\ ' ing to \vorry ab;_)u t a 
r...: spon:; ibiiity to maximi ze share ho klcr ,. ;tiu'~- t il ,:: \V c: li -being of ocher corpo-
r:ttc cun:;ti tuent s. or just th e inte rnal P(' liti c; ,,( tl:c gL:-;c; c>!Tce tovve r. 
The firm that wants to break a conlllli'tn:cnt tran::;fcrs respunsibilily from 
the human actors who made the com mitmen t to a n; ificat ion, the thought 
cu nstruct that is the corporate entity. lt the reby makes it poss ible for eve n 
coopera tive human types to side -step the dictates of mora l sentiments: 
"We lL th e re were compe ting concern s and I can ·r impose my feelings o n th e 
orga ni za tion. ' ' Indeed , th e in ve ntion of ;1 vehi cle free oi immediate mo r<1 l 
scruples must take place with cost reduction in an economic account of the 
firm 's ve ry existence . 
Re turning to Frank's commitment modeL we see that not all human be-
ings have the same commitment to cooperation. Some people are more 
lik e ly to de fect than others. We sort out one dno th er \vhen we make and 
sec k commi tments, laboring under an information asy mmetr:;i In Frank' s 
mode l. facial gestures and other tell-tal e signal s tha t are uni que to people 
he lp coo pera ti ve types search among potent ial co un tcrpa rti es for other coop-
erative tvpcs . Obvious ly. such sortin g al so goes on when we dea l with the 
<lgc nh of firms. But in the long run , th e re i ~' a dif fe re nce Because the agent:; 
t\: prcs(: nt o rganizations with clec i s iomri~lk in g_ structures thcll may be beyond 
th e dictates of any one acto r, any lun~:-tcrm cumm itm en t must be ck emccl 
,:,; ;Hin::z,;nt unless backed by <t triple-ri\ ct<:d t~O ntracl enforce<l bk by th<.: 
migl-tt uf th~..: sovere ign. or in the a!tcrnati\•.:: _ ~! :nan cldtory regulatory re gim,; . 
. ~\s yo u go further clown the hier ,uc!Ji ,:· a l iCldckr in yu ur interaction with 
the ti:·m. whethe r <1s a supp li e r. custom,_:;_ i:·;\C :il PL ·2 !11p loyee . or me;nbcc of'"' 
cc:n1n1unity. the firn1 \Vith \Vhich you in tc:rac l br.:cu:liCS less and L~ss idc t:tifi-
~1blc \Vith a p ~lr t i c uJ:Jr huntan l.Je ing and n1tl l" C ~1!"ld rn nr:...:: :_l Ct)!lS truct of (J pub-
iic rel ations lTt achine . --rh is ge ncra l iz t~ d fi :-n·: \v ill be ~- t thought cun~:trucl 
loudly co mm itted to so licitude to you r intcr,::;ts . pc:rsunifieci wit h photus :tii cl 
~~ rt t phics full of c: ...:citec!. con1n1itted. ~1ncl ~-~ r ~-llcful hun1an be ings. Firn1s pro_i cc l 
thi s in1~1ge of conlnlittrl cn t to rnin1ic tht_~ huiTL-in (t 1.~tu r ~; in the co;Tlnlit rnl:ilt 
TlltJdc l. J.3ur th-~y· ne v·er do this pcrfc:cl iy. -r·h ~tt ! :~ \\·hy \\/C should jc_;in f'lfiL ch:..~l ! 
t~ l r~~ .. t ~: i n a n:scrvoir of he::1 lthy,. susr_; ic icl::. 
! V Reptt ro! i 0111 1! -~ -( 0 i ?SiFO fill.\' 
Spc;."!~ !ng of public rclc1tiuns. \vh at ;_t b, ·lul (i...'j)UL.~t!urr.d cunstrai:1ts'! !t -,· ·· 
truis:r! uC l~l \V :n1d ·~co non1lcs thnt rcpc·at p~~ty ;.: r :.; \\'t)rr;.-' ~lhout their rcpur~·i ·· 
Tl:c George 'vVashingron Law Rc;.·ie: ,-
tions: the greater the va lue o f an actor's reputa tiOi1. th,~ rncrc rcli3bie th e 
e1c tor will be as :1 counte rparty. Reputational con st r;,int :; du o p e ra te in lhis 
w;ty. ,·,f cuursc. r nd eccl . reputation may con strair: et lirm '.vhcn it ic:n•:_-:, '.lli-
coiL·;tr :: tincd 1nany an uncoop erative hun1an being. :\ Ltrgc firn1 h <J~, ~-1 L1rge 
pu blic profile . ~m el. like <1 po liticia n, a correspondir, ~:! ~: !J \Uln ·~i <:lliii tv tu 
h;_:_cl puhhci iy. -IT~ i :~ vu ln e ra b il it\' const rain s the ;·t :· ;:·: ~ ;:·:)ik: _' ~~ :<ri \~J. t!- t: n ;~; 
;-i ~ :!TL li: ; _ j ! _'f;,_~ L-lZ J : · \\ · ; ·, r ; '-~ ~ t l 1jU ~; t \Y;_·tJ k ~1\\:;_l y ~ii1 d ilh>\ '·:.· ,_:; ·; ~ '. .. -· \ :z .. : : ~-j~----
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Firrn cul tures c::t!! bt..:cun1c ingro\vn a nd Jeinc~-ltcd. t- ~l i :!di n ,~ :_ t·-~~ur:·~ ii·i Cirt.(l::; Lt . ..: 
their own long-term in tcrest; _:o f urthermore, n::p u i:_ ;ll (i':~1i C\ ICiC\:rn:-; :'me 
subst<lnt ially diluted when attention turn s !'rCiii: ;1cr fonnaiJC <: with 
cuuntc:rpa rties to corporate good citizenship. 
Firms wishing to escape the reputational co nseq uences of bad actions 
also have options that people do not. They can morp il by '>C iling the ir assets. 
merg ing, changing th e ir name, or just repopulating and re:c rca tin g them -
se lves . 'Il1e rein ve ntio n o f se lf that is the umnra in ablc id e a l or th e 
postmock rn subject is easy for a firm. If some s tub o f En ro n·s busi ness 
e me rges from Chapter ll to continue producin g for the purpose of making 
payments to its legions of s tiffed creditors, it '.vi ii bear <i new n;JIW:: and sho\v 
a new logo. Fide/ion seems like a good choice. 
This shou ld not be take n to say that firms always defect. Nor should it 
be take n to se1y that reputation does not matte r. This should be tak en as a 
w~1 rn ing: when yo u de a I wit h a firm, as opposed to a h UI11 <1 n bci ng. in fornw-
lion asy mmetri es always wi ll be bigger and mora l con tro l:; <li '-N<<v:; '>Vii l be eli-
lu ted . G ive n a fi rm 's purpos ive cl ecisionmakin g system. 1t is more likely than 
an inc.liv icluai to beh ave !i ke a ra tiona l economic :tcWr. 
V Evolutionary Surviu!l 
\Vh\::re docs thi s k;we us. as consumers and wo:·k cr~ !i\in~: in ~l three -
dimcns iun cd wurkl where firms that are not scnr icnl d() mu:,t of til e pruduc -
ing) A notil·~r mock! frorn evol uti onary game th ,~o rv helps <: !h w•.:c this LjLk:s-
li rJ rL ~ ! i t bids us tc) in1~.1g in c a un ive rse o f coo pcr2tc r~ t·1nd ;_L:fcclt)!-s ... ., .. ho p lay 
Frtsc; ; ~( ~ r s· Di!c n; n12 in ~l une -d in1 ensio na! space. ~~ ·!~h c.:y d!·.~ net r .:1r:Jurn lv i i ·1 -
1.~..; rac !. in ;;1 vacu urn. ~n:-;tc< td. th ey occupy and are drr~Jng ~;c l ~~1 ~ -! l ung b ut L;Jit c 
.l!l thi~; mc ci cl. th ·.:y play Pri so ners' Dilemm a 'X ith trL:ir i; ·dmedic; [c n·::igh-
hu rs Clc r o ~;:; g· ... :ncr~1Liun s . E~veryo n e except th e t \ '/0 r:· L_t y~~ : ·:~.~ :·!t ~ht; t\\.' 0 1 • .:: \"; C~:) ur 
ll1i:~ \·c ry [iJ I"lg_ l'i.J\\' b et S t\VO neighbors. rille rnudcJ s i H.J\\.' ~) th :i t (JVC r t in~ c . l ik e 
ir(di··.: iduaLs \vi!! cl uster ~dong the ro\v. ~fo ~;Ct.'. \\ · hy ~ i rr:; <~ in c d :-: t~· _:S ! rJ•~:1 t 'J c: ClJ-· 
b ::~ t~ li1ninat c d. Sir-niJ~·lrly. iso la ted cooperators SC(.lttt..:red in ~.rc:~_ ; ps cd· l\v·o in 
~~ \: l'cc ·L{1 !· ~ · ~:,p ;:1Ccs \\·il! h~:: \..' l inli natecl. But i f you c~· t n .~-: {~ -~ :! c,:~;>_~ ;:y t:- f f;;ur ~ . : l ~; : ·:·· 
.~i' ()n L-. i ~ r OJl. ri;·!n cul!.urc. and rcputat io n:Ji CtJ n str~t i nt ~ . ~;,.: • : \\ .. i!li:~! ·!\ \\ ' . L~ r i U \l :l. _:-.. :,r ,· ··l !l 
:rnd ril 1' !>urk Sirle (lf Siturcliuider \ (t!uc . 7(l T u L. L. R r.::\· . 1·275 ( :i!ll~.) -
~ I St.'t' f3 _; ..:_; .. \ :--.; S ;...:. y R.\·\S. l VUL l. IT I< . l:\' or Tl i~ SucJ ; \I c( j;"~ · l ~~ : \( .I .=;:~ - () l ( 1 ')\; ·:~. j . 
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tig_U OUS Ct) •~)percl t OrS togc t ht.~r . COOpe ratiOn '.Nili have (1 hi gher ~1V~: fc1gt: ritness 
th ~in cJ ct"t~i: t i on \\·i th in th~·~t se~rnen t. Over tin1c . the n ;.rnlb c) ·:~ ,: ·J ~copj:;r~t tors 
·- -~ 1- \' ()f (.'tJnln lt:ni TJ.r-2:.:. nt' ccn p (; r (~ tor~. 
· rh~:-.; in1(l g_2 1~2lis us s'.)Il1et hing. about the int~..~rr·,;~~iliult s ·,.;; ;_·ut·rj;,) f{tl !t.)i1 ~ 
~;_ nd pr:.:nplc . \V ilh the qualificatio n that corp orar. i on~; Cdi1 c: ;1tt~r i11tu cuJTHn uni-
t i...: S uf coop c.:~-~tt UfS . dC ting LlS coup~ r~1t o rs ;.J.nd t~1L i n ~ ILt...: L~~'(i l~ l- it :_J \:f \_~ uvpc: rt:L­
tion. ~ t-hi~ can cont inue for ex tended periods o f tinl•.:. £)u 'l i~d· .. ·r :r :·(;_t iona lity 
signa ls defection. corporati ons move to the periph ery . 
By way of example. le t me cite the im plicit contract:. tl:at ckvc lopeci bc-
twcc n firms and Lhc ir lung-t erm em ployees in the post-\var p,;riod :md per-
si:,;tcd until the mid Lu late 19SOs. Signili cant human c~rp ildi contr ibutions 
early in the employee 's career with the fi rm trigge red a q u ~l:; i-ent itk me nt to 
compe nsation in th,_:: form of long-term e rn ploymen t. T hcs•:: commitments 
we re de stroyed at many firms by defectin g manc1ger:; a nd share holclcrs. 
T hus. American co rporations evolved from post \V<H rm:nageriali sm to the 
sh;:,rcholcler valuism ot the 1990s. ll1e m anage ricili st coupt.::'ra1or firm s be-
c:ame de fectors that ac! roitl y moved from th e midsr o f Lhe hLim<!n community 
to its peri phery. t!w:re to ~te p up their payo ffs and cntuncc shareholder 
value . ~-' 
I be lieve we c\!l intuitive ly grasp the point that corpor;:tt i•Jns h ~tvc· a spe-
cial propens ity ttJ defec E. just as rhcy also can h:.:tve ~pcc:i :.:1i rc~-1~~:un s to coopcr--
~1te. J· .. Jo te tha t such \-vur r ies a bout defect ion (~un1e 1·~) bec.1r even n1ore 
sq ua rely ag~t in~l go·.,.ernrnt:nta! o rga ni zat ions. ~ -!cliv~it!ng th,_~ nLtii v ic:-2'~ : instl-
tL:ti o ns ~t dcii· :;sscc! to limitin g gove rnment powL:r. 
f--Iaving e~~:tablishl~d ~ hi s poin t of corft n:on ~1 \ity. L;t u:-: n\~1:,v contt":.t~; t our 
ZlC<llm ent of que:,;t i,;lls ;)l. gove rnment responsil·iiity '.v i ~h c :H tr ,~<ltmc nt of 
qlJcs ti ons of c~)cpor~·t t~ r:;:::spr.)nsibll ity. "\Vith governiT1 ~nt. ~1ffcctc-~~_j con~;t itu (~ n­
cics ~~~~~t \npur th rnugh dz::n o~~ r :.:_ tic proc~s~_~cs . ""-...[,:;-;_ :-:.u \vith Lrrn :~. /\ i te rna-
~ i v ~~ l y· ' \'.; i ! h 
t ~g:..ll21tu r y jur isd ic1.ion :.; hn uiLi l:Jt.:  ves ted at th e n1 c'~~;: _juni!_·;r. i;ut f ~ ~1~~ib il; k.~ ·.,' cL 
~~ L.ttc ;xnd L.JCtil r:~:guicllo!·.Y ju1· isd iction suppu::::ed:::. i.._,::..·~~-~ ·~·_.; -~- ;_·;._, · ,_-~~ · n r!"~l:'iit n-Jure 
rt·sponsi\' ~ t t.) citiz~.: : l }·in.::ft.~r-.:: ~:c es . Srna!ler i~ br~tt~~- u nL~:~~-; \ .. Uu ·(.·.\,_· d vt~ry 
r=:·:~·~ s on . T<ut :-:c) -. .--;itt·_, fii-;i ·l ::: . 
prcclil: t !·:i c ~-~~ ~-tn d lr!()l';.; dj~-~~-:;~lti::;l:Jctio n conccrnjr!g the ~~--.:"~..:J e_·;~- r;:_:;;por J::> ilJ~; ity 
curpur:_~tl:J:.r>; l~:!.:e for tht~ cons~que n ces of tht::ir ~~~-·r i c !L-.~ . , ~-1 -:.: . ..: \..--- ;ct c~ rians h;Jd a 
, : ·!lie'·< ~.~i-~:->~·:--\ · ~;t;:.:\JL; t hut dn n~1 t f •-'["1 !i t..:~tL' ~ ! ;;_ d ·-·:· k ;_ ~; ·i . ~ ; · :'; !~: ;~- ~~inl. ~~b~ ) IJ[ 
~h~ -.....;:'l:_lf;lli!_Hl '.)r u~.\TI·--r~;li1"' :i~]r_! -..:• __ -,i1i1" 1-~ J. s;_~ ~· /\UOl _t: .~. Bi:!-:i_i : ·S:. C :.\i ~!) ;_'<; :-.:. c .\I! .- \.'<S . ·rl i F 
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point wh e n they S<lid th a t big fir ms hold out intrinsic dangers to <l free m~; rk et 
republi c.~-~ A ce11tury ~1gu. \ Ve waived this objection to take the [!,~n elit:; c•i 
sca le c(...:n nun1ics. -fl1c resu lting tensiun nc-.,Jcr goes a\vay~ even ::t ~ th e rt.> 
pro~~ch ~ tgi.l in:...;t ·..= orpur~1te po \ver has lost it s inclivlcl ualist colur~·ltiun . 
\ ·,r !!u.:1:er !ill t: (_--- /rl tt tl.\ 
·' : ' > . ... -
p loitin; t:! ~.: t:~,; l ~ <~cti\'t-: :1c1ion pi·ol.>l !.:: n;::: c f others . c·nnsic!cr J sLt ~.! ~~:ti c. 
OEC[) CllU ntri cs h2ve tended to cl ecre2se th eir corporate tax ntcs ov,;r t h i~ 
last two d iX cld cs.~ " The average top co rporate tax rate in OEl_"LJ cuu nt ri e:' 
was 6 J>oints lo wer at the end of the 1980s than it was at the beginning of the 
decade for a proportionate red ucti on of L2 % .2ri The average top ra te on in-
terest income d ropped 13 po ints fo r a proport ional reduction of 25 % . ~ 7 
Meanwhile, taxation on labm·~on people-~has gone up. In the EU. during a 
thirteen year period, tax r<ltes on em ployed labo r grew by one-fifth , wh ile 
rates on capita l decreased by one-tenth. 2" Doubtless these changes resulted 
in part fro m an ideological shift. .tvlaybe firms wield intlue nce better as well. 
And maybe they p!Jy a holdup gam e, bidding tax rates down by threat e ning 
to mo ve the ir capital to a lower tax jur isdiction. Labor~peop l e more ti ed to 
homes and communiti es than capital and therefore more con1mittecl to soc i-
ety~gets left holding the bag. Whatever the theo re tical pluses and minuses 
of tax ing C<lp itaL there is someth ing wrong goi ng on~something irrespon-
sib le. 
This jump-shift to t<l\ation lets me close with a reference to th e Be rit: -
Dodd dclxne . Ber!e tho ught th at co rporate responsibility was best hallClled 
through ou~si cl e re gulation. Toci8y. publ ic economic theory advances on th<lt 
view. suggcs till!Z that regul::tory goa ls should be accompl ished \vith pin poi nt 
Pigouvi;tl1 l;t:-.:e:; _ Soci;1 l il ls shou ld be re mecl iccl th rough govc r-r;mcnl spcml-
ing rJth cr tha n thn1ugh ;_he irn pos itio 11 u; c\ l1 aust ive regul atory rule bouk~. 
be li eve tlh: ~c assert ions to be Sll un cl . at least in thcorv. But 1.!1'.:: Duints rinc:: 
,/ l ..... . 
ho ll ow it firms c tn esca pe t<t.\ <ltion in the first place by exp loiting coord1n z:-
-.- I 1 
- { I (/, 
::.::.--; .\"(';,_' \\ . i !l i~ :! l1 \\ .. . H r:tl i Lli1 i..\~ J u~cph .~. ;\h.:Cctl h: r:: . l(n· c .. (I(JI'c/iililfi(l/l(/Jld 'lit.\" ( ·,Jii fl, ' f/{,'.:li! 
ui i/i c' ~~-llJ'!.'f J : ' :ii! L'niun. L.'t·;.tiuuring !he· Ct }{ f,_· t 1 ( C,)n:/u!.'i (),1/ FJusiness 7(1xuiiun . _-~.-~ Ci .·. ;:-.! • ; _'< 
\lKT. L Rl\. (,/~ . 6::; -+ 12 1111\). 
